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Abstract 
 
For Deleuze, the exemplary novelist (Joyce, Proust, Robbe-Grillet…) disposes within original difference two heterogeneous series 
of signifier and signified (Sixth Series on Serialization
1).  These two series resonate through a single homogenous series of names 
where each term can be seen to relate to the preceding one and the next one, thus:  n1→ n2→ n3→ n4→….   The first name, or 
signifier, relates to the second name/signifier, relates to the third etc in the familiar continuous chain of signifiers.  It is the novelist’s 
task to consider this homogenous chain from the point of view of “that which alternates in this succession”
2 – ie the alternation of 
signified and signifier through the terms  - and to allow these to resonate. 
 
In what way is the architect a novelist, and in what way is exemplary architecture disposed according to this strategy of primary 
difference, homogenous chain of signifiers and the creative diagnosis of two resonating, heterogeneous series? 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
Deleuze’s Logic of Sense is a serial work, presenting “a series of paradoxes which form the theory of 
sense”
3.  The book is a series of series.  Each supposedly individual “chapter” is named a “series” – 
thus, for instance, the sixth division of the book is entitled “Sixth Series on Serialization” – and these 
series are themselves presented as a series of 34 divisions
4. 
 
 
 
2 
The exposition of these paradoxes presents a “convoluted story”.  Logic of Sense “is an attempt to 
develop a logical and psychological novel.”
5  The term “novel”, referring as it does in this case to 
Deleuze’s own philosophical work, is here widely drawn.
6 
 
We posit, in this context, that the exemplary architect is a novelist; and exemplary architecture, a novel. 
 
 
                                             
1 Gilles Deleuze, Logic of Sense, pp36-41.  As noted below, Logic of Sense is organised in a series of “chapters” entitled 
“First Series of…”, “Second Series of….” and so on up to the 34
th series 
2 Logic of Sense, 36 
3 Logic of Sense, xiii 
4 Deleuze in the structure of the book and in the naming of the structure of the book is calling into question the status of 
the individual identifiable element in the name of a primary difference.  Identity is derived from an originary differentiation 
(without originating terms), from an originary différance, to use Derrida’s term.  As Derrida says in his encomium for 
Deleuze: “From the beginning, all of his books… have been for me not only, of course, strong provocations to think but 
each time the flustering, really flustering, experience of a closeness or of a nearly total affinity… [he speaks of] an 
irreducible difference in opposition to dialectical opposition, a difference “more profound” than a contradiction.. a difference 
in the joyously repeated affirmation…. ”. “I’m going to have to wander all alone” in Jacques Derrida The Work of Mourning 
pp192-3.  The series, here, is hyper-serial: it is a series composed necessarily of elements which only occur through and by 
virtue of the movement of the series, and which are themselves therefore serial in nature. 
5 Logic of Sense, xiv 
6 Deleuze speaks later of the art of the clinician who renews a “symptomatological table” of disorders, producing a work of 
art in doing so.  The artist, in turn, is a “clinician of civilization”.  And both are novelists: “It seems, moreover, that an 
evaluation of symptoms might be achieved only through a novel.” Logic of Sense, 237 page 2 of 4 
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3 
The ontology of architecture
7 must be precisely understood.  To state briefly what such an ontology is 
not
8: 
 
•  we dismiss any interpretation of Deleuze’s work which implies that architecture can be or should 
be a representation of elements of his philosophy, such as “the fold” - a tactic which displays 
ignorance of the import of this term, and more generally disregards Deleuze’s distain of the 
static logic of representation 
•  any ontology of architecture which claims that the task of the architect is to create forms in 
matter, must be rejected.  In this context, we could point for instance to many of the essays in 
Deleuze and Space
9 which, making reference to Bernard Cache
10 and Greg Lynn’s work, speak 
of the “built form” which the architect creates 
•  in turn, the transposition of a Deleuzian logic onto the creative processes of the architect, such 
processes resulting in the above-mentioned built form, is irrelevant to the question of 
architectural ontology.  Architecture is not the creative act of the architect; it is the event of its 
occurrence as architecture 
 
 
4 
The logic of sense is explicated by means of the concepts of, on the one hand, “states of affairs” - which 
are bodies, objects, things which, as Deleuze states, exist in the present and can form mixtures with 
each other; and on the other, the concept of “events”, which are “incorporeal” entities which do not exist 
but rather “subsist or inhere”.  States of affairs relate to each other by means of causes, but not effects.  
States of affairs effect, instead, events
11. 
 
We posit: architecture is not a question of states of affairs, but of events.  But what is an event? 
 
 
 
7 Or rather, from the point-of-view of most ontologies of architecture heretofore, the non-ontology of architecture 
8 Using the strategy of something like negative theology (God cannot be defined, but is not anything which can be defined 
or spoken.).  We justify this appeal to negative theology by reference to Deleuze’s position that the identity of the 
individual, that is, identity in general, that is, all ontologies commonly so-named which begin from identity and essence 
rather than originary difference, depend on the concept of God.  Ontology = ontotheology.  See the essay “Klossowski or 
Bodies-Language” pp280ff in Logic of Sense.  Also see Derrida and Negative Theology 
9 Ian Buchanan and Gregg Lambert, eds, Deleuze and Space (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005).  Not all of this 
collection is bad: Claire Colebrook for instance brings a properly philosophical understanding to bear on the question of 
Deleuzian space; the Deleuzian political questions she raises are entirely relevant to architecture but space does not permit 
this series to be resonated here 
10 In relation to Cache, see Earth Moves, the Furnishing of Territories (MIT UP, 1995) for instance page 29ff where he 
states: “We are then back to thinking of form as form, which means that we take things as images, with no relation to 
depth, to anteriority, or to use, and even less to representation…. We will now consider architecture to be nothing but the 
interlocking of frames.  We will also henceforth attribute to any given object the states of simple image….”  Cache’s 
analysis here is subtle and warrants analysis in turn.  See also Objectile Patrick Beaucé + Bernard Cache Fast-Wood: A 
Brouillon Project (Springer, 2007) where he states: “How do we prevent the non-standard from collapsing into original 
formalism?  How do we see to it that the object is genuinely conceived and produced as a single instance in a series?  How 
do we integrate the architectural object in the urban fabric?” (no pagination in this book, very helpfully, but this quote 
comes from the essay Towards a non-standard mode of production [by Cache and Beaucé] on the page with notes 14-16).  
To make clear the distinction we are drawing here: for us, the term “architectural object” is the exemplary oxymoron - of all 
things which might be an object, architecture is the last possible one the least likely to be one; and for us, the serial can 
never be an issue to do with an object being a single instance in a series.  The series we speak of is the Deleuzian series 
which, as in all of Deleuze’s work from the outset, neither operates within one of the terms of the subject-object split nor 
respects this conceptualisation, but instead constantly works within what Deleuze in his first published work characterises 
as irreducible life (in Mathesis, Science and Philosophy 1946): “…the knowing mind, as distinct as it might be in itself from 
the extension with which it appears to have strictly nothing in common, nonetheless deploys the order of things in thinking 
the order of its representations.  At the very moment where unity is affirmed, this unity breaks apart and destroys itself… 
But in being broken apart, Descartes now remarks, unity finds its true sense in re-forming upon another plane, where it 
finds its true meaning.  In so far as the theoretical disunion of thought and extension is affirmed, so too is the fact of their 
practical union, as a definition of life.  Unity does not come about at the level of an abstract God transcending humanity, 
but in the very name of concrete life… the unity… is the unity of life itself, which delineates a third order, irreducible to the 
other two” 
11 Logic of Sense, pp4-5.  The whole terminology here of “states of affairs”, “events”, “facts” and (as we will come to) 
“propositions” derives from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, another serial work where some of the series 
approximate in number to the 34 in Logic of Sense.  Take number 2.01: “A state of affairs (a state of things) is a 
combination of objects (things).”  It is also noteworthy that the Tractatus also has a brief preface, which states that the 
purpose of it was that it “gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it”.  Does that perhaps make it, too, a 
novel? page 3 of 4 
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5 
We can make propositions about “states of affairs”; this relationship Deleuze names “denotation”
12.   
Propositions are expressed by someone, and the relationship between the proposition and that person is 
named “manifestation”
13.  Propositions “signify”, which means that the words of the proposition relate to 
general concepts, that is, to other propositions in turn
14.  Deleuze shows in the Third Series that neither 
denotation, nor manifestation, nor signification is primary, and that we pass in a circle from one to the 
other. 
 
Sense is a fourth dimension of the proposition
15: “Sense is both the expressible or the expressed of the 
proposition, and the attribute of the state of affairs”
16 and as such is the “boundary” between states of 
affairs and propositions, having the status of an “event”: 
  “We will not therefore ask what is the sense of the event: the event is sense itself”
17 
 
 
6 
Sense is always presupposed; Deleuze, following Bergson, likens it to a “sphere” within which we 
always already exist “in order to enact possible denotations”
18.  The obverse of this is the paradox of 
infinite regress, since what we say always therefore relates to a preceding term
19 in serial fashion: 
  “each denoting name has a sense which must be denoted by another name: n1→ n2→ n3→ n4→…”
20 
The first name, or signifier, relates to the second name/signifier, relates to the third etc in a continuous 
chain of signifiers. 
 
 
7 
It is the novelist’s task to consider this homogenous chain from the point of view of “that which alternates 
in this succession”
21.  What alternates through the chain are signified and signifier, in a specific manner 
whereby if n1 denotes a preceding name, then this act of denotation has a sense – it is an event of 
sense – and n2 then denotes in turn this event of sense.  n2 in turn, in effecting this denotation, then also 
occurs as an event of sense, to be denoted in turn by n3. 
 
Thus a homogenous series is seen as two heterogeneous series, occurring between a number of types 
of element (events and states of affairs; propositions and denoted objects; expressions and 
denotations
22).  The two series must not be seen as having a relation of original signified and derived 
signifier. It is only the signifier which creates the signified, and vice versa
23. 
 
 
 
12 Logic of Sense, p12.  Compare series 3 of Tractatus 
13 Logic of Sense, p13 
14 Logic of Sense, p14 
15 A fourth dimension not recognised by “those who wish to be satisfied with words, things, images and ideas” (Logic of 
Sense, p20).  This may refer to Wittgenstein 
16 Logic of Sense, p22 
17 ibid 
18 Logic of Sense, p28 
19 It is always instructive to see how philosophers and other thinkers deal with this infinite regress.  Bertrand Russell uses 
the theory of types to control this movement (cf  his 1908 essay “Mathematical Logic as Based on The Theory of Types” 
pp57ff in Logic and Knowledge) and Deleuze makes (unreferrenced) use of the “type” in the Sixth Series on Serialization – 
the implications of which we do not have time to go into here.  Lewis Carol, the subject of the whole of Logic of Sense, 
makes use of regress but in the example which Deleuze cites [“The name of the song is called “Haddock’s Eyes.”” “Oh, 
that's the name of the song, is it?” Alice said, trying to feel interested.  “No, you don't understand,” the Knight said, 
looking a little vexed. “That's what the name is called. The name really is “The Aged Aged Man.”” “Then I ought to have 
said “That's what the song is called”?” Alice corrected herself.  “No, you oughtn't: that's quite another thing! The song is 
called “Ways and Means“: but that's only what it's called, you know!”  “Well, what is the song, then?” said Alice, who 
was by this time completely bewildered.  “I was coming to that,” the Knight said. “The song really is “A-Sitting On a Gate“: 
and the tune's my own invention.”] this regress is halted by the last statement about what the song “really is”.  Taking 
another example, almost at random, Quine, in his essay “Ontological Relativity” (pp 26ff in Ontological Relativity and other 
Essays, Columbia University Press 1969) begins by stating “I hold that knowledge, mind, and meaning are part of the same 
world they have to do with, and that they are to be studied in the same empirical spirit that animates natural science.  
There is no place for a prior philosophy.”  Contrast, of course, those such as Derrida for whom this non-place is of interest; 
and those such as Husserl who hover on the edge of such an interest – hence Derrida’s concern and hence Deleuze’s 
appeal to Husserl’s concept of noema in explicating the pure event of sense (Logic of Sense, pp 20-21) 
20 Logic of Sense, p36 
21 Logic of Sense, p36 
22 Logic of Sense, p37  
23 “We will not say, therefore…. that the one is originary and the other derived… they are strictly simultaneous…” p41, 
Logic of Sense  page 4 of 4 
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8 
In the case of Joyce there is a series surrounding “Bloom” which is given as the signifying set; and a 
corresponding signified series “Ulysses”; between which the author establishes a resonance and relation 
by various narrative means.
24 
 
In the case of Proust: 
  It is … a question of two series, that of a former present (Combray as it was lived) and that of a 
present present.  No doubt,…… there is a resemblance between the two series (that is, the 
madeleine, breakfast)… nevertheless the secret does not lie there.
25 
  Combray reappears not as it was or as it could be, but in a splendour which was never lived…  
here, Combray reappears in the form of a past which was never present.
26 
 
In all cases
27, it is for Deleuze the differences between the series and their terms which “become 
primary”, not the resemblances. 
 
 
9 
Exemplary architecture, as an event of sense, has the following characteristics which it shares with the 
novel: 
•  it occurs in the neither active nor passive moment where states of affairs (ie buildings, 
environments, cities) effect events.  Not: the door; but the active/passive event to walk through 
the door, to be walked through. Not: the shutters; but the active/passive event to open the 
shutters, to be opened.  Not:  the bell; but the active/passive event to hear the bell; to be 
resonated
28 
•  the sense of architecture is what is expressed or expressible in its proposition.  A proposition 
need not be verbal
29, but is always manifested
30 
•  what architecture expresses does not get expressed outside this expression; the relations of 
signified/signifier do not have any original term, architecture is not derived (say from function, 
social mores etc) any more than function and social mores derive from architecture.  The 
difference between the two, animated by the work of architecture, is primary 
•  it will dispose elements (events and states of affairs, say) within itself such that a supposedly 
past reference (the door with sloping sides to the Palazzo Farnese; the drainage grills in Basel’s 
streets and the insult to Loos; the event of sound to the east façade of Ronchamp) reoccurs and 
resonates within the new architectural event (the entrance doors to Asplund’s city library; the 
shutters to Herzog & de Meuron’s Schuetzenmatt Strasse apartment block; the entrance facade 
of Shaulager) 
 
 
10 
Deleuze, in Difference and Repetition, states: 
 
  [The novel] opens on to the difference of Being by taking its own difference as object, by posing 
the question of its own difference 
 
We should expect no less from architecture. 
 
24 Logic of Sense, p39 
25 Difference and Repetition, p122 
26 Difference and Repetition, p85 
27 Deleuze mentions also Klossowski, Robbe-Grillet, Witold Gombrowicz, Poe…. 
28 In relation to this eventful nature, architecture considered merely as a state of affairs (the window, the door, the building, 
the environment) is to destructively and naively reduce it 
29 See Wittgenstein, Tractatus  3.1431 “The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one 
composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written ones.  Then the spatial arrangement of 
these things will express the sense of the proposition.” p12 
30 that is, is eventful and relates to the partaker 